The paper considers a growth model with climate change and three R&D sectors dedicated to energy, backstop and CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) eciency.
Introduction
As recommended by the IPCC, emerging green technologies reveal crucial for a costeective climate change mitigation policy. Such abatement technologies include for instance renewable energies, but also the possibilities to reduce the carbon emissions coecient of fossil fuels. Among this second alternative, and according to the IPPC (2005), CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) seems promising. As formulated by Hoert et al. (2002) , the decarbonisation, i.e. the reduction of the amount of carbon emitted per unit of primary energy, is intimately linked to sequestration. Carbon capture, sometimes referred to emissions control (see Kolstad and Toman, 2001) , is the way of achieving this decarbonisation.
This process consists in separating the carbon dioxide from other ux gases during the process of energy production. It is particularly adapted to large-scale centralized power stations but may also indirectly apply to non electric energy supply. Once captured, the gases are then being disposed into various reservoirs. The sequestration reservoirs include depleted oil and gas elds, depleted coal mines, deep saline aquifers, oceans, trees and soils. Those various deposits dier in their respective capacities, their costs of access or their eectiveness in storing the carbon permanently.
There exists a large strand of literature on economic growth, climate change and technological improvements (see for instance Bosetti Popp, 2004 Popp, , 2006a Popp, , 2006b ). In those models, the analysis usually focuses on the optimal trajectories and their comparison with the business-as-usual scenario. For many reasons that will be discussed below, it may be relevant to examine some intermediate cases between these two polar ones. Nevertheless, a decentralized economy framework is required to perform such an analysis. The objective of this paper is to complete the literature mentioned above by setting up a general equilibrium analysis that allows to compute any equilibrium in the decentralized economy.
In line with the "top-down" approach and based on the DICE and ENTICE-BR models (Nordhaus, 2008, and Popp, 2006a , respectively), we develop an endogenous growth model in which energy services can be produced from a polluting non-renewable resource as well as a clean backstop. Moreover, we assume that carbon emissions can be partially released by using a CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technology. We introduce three R&D sectors, the rst one improving the eciency of energy production, the second one, the eciency of the backstop and the last one, the eciency of the sequestration process. With this respect, we have to consider two types of market failures: the pollution associated with the carbon emissions that are not stockpiled and the research spillovers in each R&D sector. That is why, in the decentralized equilibrium, we introduce two kinds of economic policy instruments in accordance: an environmental tax on the carbon emissions and a research subsidy for the energy, backstop and CCS R&D sectors. There is an equilibrium associated to each vector of instruments. Clearly, when public instruments are optimally set, the equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincides with the rst best optimum.
In particular, we provide a full expression of the optimal carbon tax and we analyze its dynamic properties. We show that the tax can evolve non-monotonically over time and we characterize the driving forces that make it either growing or declining.
Next, we calibrate the model to t the world 2005 data. As suggested by the theoretical ndings, the optimal carbon tax reveals generally non-monotonic over time. We nd that the implementation of this tax alone hardly provides any incentive to proceed with R&D activities. In order to provide enough R&D incentives, one needs rst to correct for the externality by imposing a carbon tax and second by subsidizing the research sectors.
Moreover, the introduction of some atmospheric pollution cap (or equivalently, an higher level of tax) reinforces: i) the recourse to CCS option in the middle run to prevent ceiling exceeding, and ii) the necessity to subsidy research to improve CCS eciency.
A full description of the set of equilibria oers several advantages. Under a positive point of view, it allows to examine how the economy reacts to policy changes. We can thus look at the dissociated eect of a particular policy instrument as well as a particular subset of them, the other ones being unchanged. This will give some insights on the complementarity/substitutability of public tools. For instance, we show empirically that the simultaneous implementation of a carbon tax and appropriate R&D subsidies can strengthen the role of the backstop. Under a normative point of view, as usual, this approach allows for the computation of the economic instruments that restore the rstbest optimum. However, because of budgetary, socioeconomic or political constraints, the enforcement of rst-best optimum can be dicult to achieve for the policy-maker that would rather implement second-best solutions. Finally, another advantage is the possibility to compare the outcome of a cost-benet analysis in a partial equilibrium approach with the one coming from a general equilibrium framework (Gerlagh et al., 2008) .
A diculty inherent to the characterization of the decentralized equilibrium in endogenous growth models lies in the way the research activity is modelled, in particular the type of innovation goods which are developed as well as their valuation. In the standard endogenous growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Romer, 1990 Popp (2004 Popp ( , 2006a . To provide innovations with an appropriate valuation, we adopt the shortcut proposed by Grimaud and Rougé (2008) 1 in the case of growth models with polluting resources and environmental concerns. This shortcut is based on the comparison between the socially optimal value of innovations, i.e. the income received by the innovator that would provides incentives to optimally produce innovations, with the value she eectively perceives at the decentralized equilibrium. Some empirical studies (Jones, 1995; Jones and Williams, 1998; Popp, 2004 Popp, , 2006a nd that this last value is lower than the former one. This is justied in the standard literature by the presence of several failures that prevent the decentralized equilibrium to implement the rst-best optimum 2 .
In the present paper, we assume that the eective value of innovations is in fact equal to a given proportion (here, 30%) of the socially optimal one 3 . As already mentioned above, some R&D subsidies can be enforced in order to reduce the gap between these social and eective values 4 .
1 See also Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007) . 2 Jones and Williams (2000) exhibit four of them. i) the duplication eect: the R&D sector does not account for the redundancy of some research projects; ii) the intertemporal spillover eect: inventors do not account for that ideas they produce are used to produce new ideas; iii) the appropriability eect: inventors appropriate only a part of the social value they create; iv) the creative-destruction eect.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decentralized economy and studies the behavior of agents in each sector. In section 3, we characterize both the decentralized equilibrium and the rst-best optimum solutions by two sets of conditions. Next, by comparing these two sets of characterizing conditions, we show how the optimum can be implemented by appropriate public tools. In section 4, we derive a selection of numerical results and we conclude in section 5.
The decentralized economy
The model is mainly based on the DICE and ENTICE-BR models (Nordhaus, 2008 and Popp, 2006a, respectively) . We consider a worldwide economy containing four production sectors: nal output, energy services, fossil fuel and carbon-free backstop. The fossil fuel combustion process releases CO 2 ows into the atmosphere. Accumulation of those emissions acts to increase average temperatures, which implies feedbacks on the economic system that are captured by a damage function. This function measures the continuous and gradual losses in terms of nal output (i.e. the direct losses in world product induced by global warming). Moreover, an atmospheric carbon concentration cap can be eventually introduced in order to take into account the high level of uncertainty and irreversibility that is generally avoided by the standard damage function. Industrial emissions can be partly sequestered and stored in carbon reservoirs owing to a CCS device. The production of nal energy services, backstop and CCS require specic knowledge provided by three specic R&D sectors. We assume that all sectors, except R&D sectors, are perfectly competitive.
Finally, in order to correct the two types of distortions involved by the model pollution and research spillovers we introduce two types of policy tools: an environmental tax on the fossil fuel use and a subsidy for each R&D sector. Note that, because of CCS, the tax applies on the sole part of the carbon emissions which are released into the atmosphere after sequestration. In that sense, carbon taxation is disconnected from the fossil resource use.
The model is sketched in Figure 1 . Specic functional forms and calibration details are described in section 4. The following subsection derives the individual behaviors.
decade; governmental funding currently represents 76% of total US energy R&D expenditures (Nemet and Kammen, 2007 The production of a quantity Q t of nal good depends on three endogenous elements: capital K t , energy services E t , and a scaling factor Ω t which accounts from climate-related damages, as discussed below. It also depends on exogenous inputs: the total factor productivity A t and the population level L t , growing at exogenous rates g A,t and g L,t respectively.
, where the production function Q(.) is assumed to have the standard properties (increasing and concave in each argument).
We normalize to one the price of the nal output and we denote by p E,t , w t , r t and δ, the price of energy services, the real wage, the interest rate 5 and the depreciation rate of capital, respectively. Thus, the instantaneous prot of producers is
Maximizing this prot function with respect to K t , L t and E t , we obtain 5 We assume here that the representative household holds the capital and rents it to rms at a rental price Rt. Standard arbitrage conditions imply Rt = rt + δ.
the following rst-order conditions:
where J X stands for the partial derivative of function J(.) with respect to X.
The energy-CCS sector
At each time t, the amount E t of energy services is produced from two imperfect substitute primary energies: a fossil fuel, F t , and a backstop energy source, B t . Energy eciency can be improved by a stock H E,t of specic knowledge (see Popp, 2006a Denoting by p F,t and p B,t the prices of fossil fuel and backstop, and by τ t the unit carbon tax on the ow of carbon emissions (ξF t − S t ), the energy producer chooses F t , B t and I S,t that maximizes
where Π E t is the instantaneous prot before payments of innovations (we will come back on this point 6 In a model "à la Romer" with tangible intermediate goods, the energy and CCS production functions would write Et = E Ft, Bt, in section 2.1.4 below). The rst order conditions write:
Condition (6) equalizes the private cost of one unit of stockpiled carbon, 1/S I S , with the carbon tax. Moreover, from the expression of the prot function given above, the extended unit cost of fossil fuel use, denoted by c F,t , includes the fuel price, the environmental penalty and the sequestration cost:
2.1.3 The primary energy sectors
At each time t, the extraction ow F t of fossil resource depends on specic productive investments I F,t and on the cumulated past extraction. As in Popp (2004) or in Gerlagh and Lise (2005), we do not explicitly model an initial fossil resource stock that is exhausted, but we focus on the increase in the extraction cost as the resource is depleted. We denote by Z t the amount of resource extracted from the initial date up to t:
The fossil fuel extraction function writes 
Combining these two equations, and using the transversality condition lim t→∞ η t Z t = 0, we get the following fossil fuel price expression:
Dierentiating (11) with respect to time, it comes: 
The R&D sectors
There are three stocks of knowledge, each associated with a specic R&D sector (i.e. the energy, the backstop and the CCS ones). We consider that each innovation is a non-rival, indivisible and innitely durable piece of knowledge (for instance, a scientic report, a data base, a software algorithm...) which is simultaneously used by the sector which produces the good i and by the R&D sector i, i = {B, E, S}.
Here, an innovation is not directly embodied into tangible intermediate goods and thus, it cannot be nanced by the sale of these goods. However, in order to fully describe the equilibrium, we need to nd a way to assess the price received by the inventor for each piece of knowledge. We proceed as follows: i) In each research sector, we determine the social value of an innovation. Since an innovation is a non-rival good, this social value is the sum of marginal protabilities of this innovation in each sector using it. If the inventor was able to extract the willingness to pay of each user, he would receive this social value and the rst-best optimum would be implemented. ii) In reality, there are some failures that constrain the inventor to extract only a part of this social value 8 . This implies that the eective value which is received by innovators in the absence of research subsidy is 7 Again, in a model with tangible intermediate goods, the backstop technology would write Bt = B IB,t,
lower than the social one. iii) The research sectors are eventually subsidized in order to reduce the gap between these two values. reads as the optimal value of an innitely lived patent. The same procedure applies for any R&D sector i, i = {B, E, S}. We denote by γ i , 0 < γ i < 1, the rate of appropriability of the innovation value by the market, i.e. the share of the social value which is eectively paid to the innovator, and by σ i,t the subsidy rate that government can eventually apply.
Note that if σ i,t = 1 − γ i , the eective value matches the social one. The instantaneous eective value (including subsidy) is:
and the intertemporal eective value at date t is:
Dierentiating (15) with respect to time leads to the usual arbitrage relation:
which equates the rate of return on the nancial market to the rate of return on the R&D
We can now analyze the R&D sector behavior. We assume that the dynamics of the stock of knowledge in sector i is governed by the following innovation function H i (.):
where R i,t is the R&D investment into sector i. Function H i (.) is assumed to be increasing and concave in each argument 9 . At each time t, sector i supplies the ow of innovationṡ H i,t at price V i,t and demands some specic investments R i,t , so that the prot function 9 As previously, in a model with tangible intermediate goods, (17) would be replaced byḢi,t = H i Ri,t,
before payments of innovations to be maximized is Π
The rst-order condition implies:
The marginal protability of innovations in the R&D sector i is:
Finally, in order to determine the social and the eective values of an innovation for each R&D sector, we need to know the marginal protability of innovations in each production sector using them. From the expressions of Π B t and Π E t , those values are given respectively byv B B,
Therefore, the instantaneous eective values (including subsidies) of innovations are:
The household and the government
Denoting by C t the consumption at time t, by U (.) the instantaneous utility function (assumed to have the standard properties) and by ρ > 0 the pure rate of time preferences, households maximize the welfare function W = ∞ 0 U (C t )e −ρ dt subject to the following dynamic budget constraint:
where Π t is the total prots gained in the economy and T a t is a lump-sum tax (subsidy-free) that allows to balance the budget constraint of the government. This maximization leads to the following condition:
which is no other than the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule, i.e. ρ + t g C,t = r t , where t denotes the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, and g C,t
is the instantaneous growth rate of consumption.
Assuming that the government's budget constraint is balanced at each time t (i.e. the sum of the various taxes equals R&D subsidies), then we have:
where Sub i,t denotes the amount of subsidy distributed to R&D sector i:
Finally, the balance equation of the nal output writes:
where I K,t is the instantaneous investment in capital, given by:
Hence, in our worldwide economy, the nal output is devoted to aggregated consumption, fossil fuel production, backstop production, CCS, capital accumulation and R&D.
The environment and damages
Let G 0 be the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at the beginning of the planning period, G t the stock at time t and ζ, ζ > 0, the natural rate of decay. The increase in atmospheric carbon concentration drives the global mean temperature away from a given state, here the 1900 level. The dierence between this state and the present global mean temperature, denoted by T t , is taken here as the index of anthropogenic climate change. The climatic dynamic system under reduced form can be captured by the following two state equations:
Function Φ(.) links the atmospheric carbon concentration to the dynamics of temperature and is assumed to be increasing and concave in G. It is in fact the reduced form of a more complex radiative forcing function that takes into account the inertia of the climate dynamics 10 . 10 In the analytical treatment of the model, we assume, for the sake of clarity, that the carbon cycle through atmosphere and oceans as well as the dynamic interactions between atmospheric and oceanic temperatures, are captured by the reduced form (29) and (30) . Goulder and Mathai (2000) , or Kriegler and Bruckner (2004) , have recourse to such simplied dynamics. From DICE-99, the formers estimate parameters ξ and ζ that take into account the inertia of the climatic system. They state that only 64% of current emissions actually contribute to the augmentation of atmospheric CO2 and that the portion of current CO2 concentration in excess is removed naturally at a rate of 0.8% per year. However, in the numerical simulations, we adopt the full characterization of the climate module from the last version of DICE (Nordhaus, 2008) .
Global warming generates economic damages. By convention, those damages are measured in terms of nal output losses through the scaling factor Ω(T t ), with Ω (.) < 0. In addition to the damage reected by Ω t , we will possibly be induced to impose a stabilization cap on the carbon pollution stock that society can not overshoot (see for instance Chakravorty et al., 2006) :
This additional constraint can be justied by assuming that the social damage function is not able to reect the entire environmental damages, but only part of it. In reality, uncertainty in the climatic consequences of global warming can imply some discontinuities in the damage, such as natural disasters or other strong irreversibilities, that are not taken into account by the standard functional representation of the damage.
3 Decentralized equilibrium and welfare analysis
Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
From the previous analysis of individual behaviors, we can now study the set of equilibria in the decentralized economy. A particular equilibrium is associated with each quadruplet of policies {σ B,t , σ E,t , σ S,t , τ t } ∞ t=0 . It is dened as a vector of quantity trajectories {Q t , K t , E t , ...} ∞ t=0 and a vector of price proles {r t , p E,t , ...} ∞ t=0 such that: i) rms maximize prots, ii) the representative household maximizes utility, iii) markets of private (i.e. rival) goods are perfectly competitive and cleared, iv) in each R&D sectors i, innovators receive a share (γ i + σ i,t ) of the social value of innovations. Such an equilibrium is characterized by the set of equations given by Proposition 1 below. Clearly, as analyzed in the following subsection, if the policy tools are set to their optimal levels, those equations also characterize the rst-best optimum together with the system of prices that implements it. Proposition 1 At each time t, for a given quadruplet of policies {σ B,t , σ E,t , σ S,t , τ t } ∞ t=0 , the equilibrium in the decentralized economy is characterized by the following seven-equations system:
The associated system of prices r *
is obtained from the equations (1), (2), (3), (11), (13) and (18), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
Equation (32) is an arbitrage condition that equalizes the marginal net prot in terms of output due to the increase of the fossil fuel extraction by one unit (LHS) to the total marginal gain if there is no additional extraction (RHS) 11 . Equation (33) tells that the marginal productivity of the backstop (LHS) equals its marginal cost (RHS). As already mentioned, equation (34) formalizes the incentive eect of the carbon tax on the decision to invest in CCS. Equation (35) characterizes the standard trade-o between capital K t and consumption C t . Equation (36) (resp. (37) and (38)) characterizes the same kind of trade-o between specic investment into backstop R&D sector, R B,t (resp. energy R&D sector, R E,t , and CCS R&D sector, R S,t ) and consumption. Obviously, the marginal return of each specic stock of knowledge H i depends on the associated rate of subsidy σ i .
First-best optimum and implementation
The social planner problem consists in choosing {C t , I B,t , I F,t , I S,t , R B,t , R E,t , R S,t } ∞ t=0 that maximizes the social welfare W , subject to the various technological constraints, the output 11 If extraction increases by one unit, the associated revenue is QEEF and rms face two kinds of costs: the extraction cost, 1/FI F , and the pollution cost, τ (ξ − SF ). Conversely, if no more fossil resource is extracted during the time interval dt, this generates an instantaneous gain in terms of output due to the diminution in specic investment spending IF corresponding to (dIF /dt)/F | dF =0 = −FZ /FI F . Multiplying this term by the marginal utility and integrating from t to ∞ with the discount rate ρ gives the total gain in terms of utility. Finally, dividing by U (C), this expression gives the gain in terms of output as specied in the RHS of (32). allocation constraint (27) , the state equations (8), (17) , (28), (29) and (30), and nally, the environmental constraint (31) . After eliminating the co-state variables, the rst-order conditions leads to Proposition 2 below. Proposition 2 At each time t, an optimal solution is characterized by the following sevenequations system:
ρs e −(ζ+ρ)(s−t) ds (41)
where
Proof. See Appendix A2.
The interpretation of those conditions are almost the same than the ones formulated for Proposition 1, excepted that, now, all the trade-os are socially optimally solved. Note that, in equation (41), ϕ G,t denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the ceiling constraint and then we have ϕ G,t ≥ 0, with ϕ G,t = 0 for any t such that G t <Ḡ.
Recall that, for a given set of public policies, a particular equilibrium is characterized by conditions (32)- (38) of Proposition 1. This equilibrium will be said to be optimal if it satises the optimum characterizing conditions (39)-(45) of Proposition 2. By analogy between these two sets of conditions, we can show that there exists a single quadruplet {σ B,t , σ E,t , σ S,t , τ t } ∞ t=0 that implements the optimum. These ndings are summarized in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is optimal if and only if
, where σ o i,t = 1 − γ i ∀t ≥ 0, for i = {B, E, S}, and where τ o t is given by: (39) and (41) are satised by using (32) and (34) . Second, (40) and (42) are identical to (33) and (35), respectively. Third, if σ i,t = 1 − γ i , for i = {B, E, S}, then (43), (44) and (45) are identical to (36) , (37) and (38), respectively. First, Proposition 3 states that, in any R&D sector, the optimal subsidy rate must be equal to the share of the social value of innovations which is not captured by the market, in order to entirely ll the gap between the value received by the innovator and this social value. Since the γ i 's are assumed to be constant over time, then the σ o i 's are also constant. In the empirical part and according to Jones (1995) , we will postulate that γ i = 0.3, thus implying σ o i = 0.7 for i = {B, E, S}. Second, it provides the carbon tax optimal trajectory, as characterized by (46). Since Ω (T t ) < 0, we have τ o t ≥ 0 for any t ≥ 0. This expression can read as the ratio between the marginal social cost of climate change the marginal damage in terms of utility coming from the emission of an additional unit of carbon and the marginal utility of consumption.
In other words, it is the environmental cost of one unit of carbon in terms of nal good. This carbon tax can be expressed as the sum of two components. The rst one depends on the damage function and on the dynamics of the atmospheric carbon stock and temperatures.
It gives the discounted sum of marginal damages from t to ∞ coming from the emission of an additional unit of carbon at date t. The second one is only related to the ceiling constraint and depends on ϕ G . It gives the social cost at t of one unit of carbon in the atmosphere due to a tightening in the ceiling constraint. Then, the sum of these two components is the instantaneous total social cost of one unit of carbon.
Log-dierentiating (46) gives us the optimal growth rate of the tax:
As we can see in (47), the dynamics of the optimal carbon tax results in the combination of four components. In order to analyze each of them, let us assume that one unit of carbon is emitted at date t and let us consider the impact of this emission on a consumer living at any date s, s > t. First, along the time interval ∆ = s − t, this unit of carbon gradually depreciates at rate ζ per unit of time. As t increases, the length of ∆ diminishes, thus rising the impact of the unit of carbon on the utility of household at s and contributing to an increase in the tax. This impact, captured by ζ, can be designated as the decay eect. Second, we use the rate of time preferences ρ to get at date t the impact on utility generated at date s and mentioned above. As t increases, this discounted value increases, thus involving an increase in the carbon tax. This is the discount eect. Third, in equation (46), the optimal tax is expressed in terms of nal goods since U (C) appears at the denominator of this expression. As t increases, consumption increases at rate g C due to economic growth, U (C) decreases because of concavity of the utility function (whose curvature is captured by t here) and then 1/U (C) increases, thus also accounting for a rise in the tax. This eect is referred in the literature as the wealth eect, which reects the fact that, since future generations are expected to be richer than the present ones, it will become more and more expensive to compensate them for the emission of one unit of carbon today. Finally, as t increases, the integration interval in (46) is reduced, meaning that the number of people which will be harmed by the carbon emission decreases. Then, this eect, which we call the harmed generations eect, involves a decrease in the optimal carbon tax.
To sum up, we have four eects; the three rst ones act to increase the carbon tax over time, whereas the last one leads to a decrease of this tax. As a result, the shape of the tax over time is ambiguous. In the following section, we illustrate this point by depicting some monotonous or non-monotonous trajectories depending on the relative weights of those eects.
4 Empirical results
Analytical specications and calibration
Functional forms are mainly provided by the last version of the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2008) for the climate module, the nal output, the social preferences, the feedbacks on economic productivity from climate change, the total factor productivity and demographic dynamics. The energy production and R&D systems come from the ENTICE-BR model (Popp, 2006a) . For the incorporation of the CCS technology in the model, we use a specication derived from the sequestration cost function used in the DEMETER model (Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2006) 12 . All those analytical specications are listed below: We retain 7.401 GtCeq as the initial fossil fuel consumption, given in gigatons of carbon equivalent. In addition, carbon-free energy produced out of renewable energy, excluding biomass and nuclear, represented 6% of total primary energy supply. We thus retain another 0.45 GtCeq as the initial amount of backstop energy use. We retain the Gerlagh's assumption for the cost of CCS that is worth 150US$/tC. According to IEA (2006), the cumulative CO 2 storage capacity is in the order of 184 million tons per year. This value serves as a seed value for sequestration level, S 0 , in the initial year, which is then xed at 0.05 GtC. The cost of CCS sequestration and the initial storage level allow for the calibration of the initial sequestration eort using the following relation: I S,0 /S 0 =CCS cost, which implies I S,0 = 0.05GtC×150$/tC=7.5G$. The total factor productivity has been adjusted so as to produce a similar pattern of GWP development until 2100 to the one 12 In our model, we replace the cost function of fossil fuel and backstop from Popp (2006a) and the cost function of sequestration from Gerlagh (2006) by their corresponding production functions in order to derive an utility/technology canonical model. With our notations, these unit cost functions are: 
Scenarii
To study numerically the eects of policy instruments on the decentralized equilibrium, we rst run the benchmark case in which neither environmental tax nor R&D subsidies are implemented. Next, we solve the equilibrium for various values of τ t and σ i , i = {B, E, S}.
The selected cases are listed in Table 1 .
Optimal tax, no R&D subsidy
Optimal subsidy rates, no tax
Optimum without ceiling
Optimum with a 550ppm ceiling
Optimum with a 450ppm ceiling Case A refers to the laisser-faire equilibrium. In case B, we study the eect on the equilibrium of an environmental tax, for instance by setting it equal to its rst-best optimal level τ o . Similarly, we analyze the impact of optimal R&D subsidy rates in case C, by assuming γ i = 0.3 and thus σ o i = 0.7 for i = {B, E, S} and for any scenario 13 . Case D refers to the rst-best optimum without ceiling on carbon concentration. Finally, two stabilization caps of 450 and 550ppm, which are enforced owing to the specic tax trajectories τ 550 t and τ 450 t respectively, are also studied (cases E and F). 13 Although the optimal subsidy rates are the same in all scenarii, the amount of subsidies that are distributed among R&D sectors may dier. Formally, in the case of constant subsidy rates, expression (26) becomes: Subi,t = σiVi,tH i (Ri,t, Hi,t).
Numerical results

Summary of results
We adopt the following notations that will help us pointing at various facts when describing the eects of the various policy combinations. ∆X| A→D stands for the change in variable X due to a simultaneous increase of τ from 0 to τ o and of σ i from 0 to σ o i , for i = {B, E, S}. Those changes are illustrated in the following gures by a shift from the "LF" trajectories to the "Optimum" trajectories. ∆X| A→B is the change of X due to an increase in τ from 0 to τ o , given σ i = 0 (i.e. shifts from "LF" to "Opti tax" on the gures). Symmetrically, given τ = 0, ∆X| A→C denotes the change in variable X due to a simultaneous increase of the σ i from 0 to σ o i (i.e. shifts from "LF" to "Opti subs."). Finally, ∆X| D→E/F measures the change in X due to an increase in the tax level, given the optimal enforcement of the R&D policies (i.e. shifts from "Optimum" to "Optimum 550" or "Optimum 450"). Table 2 summarizes the ndings from our sensitivity analysis conducted consequently, i.e.
provides the signs of the ∆ for the main variables of interest (where insignicant changes are depicted by ∼). 14 
Optimal carbon tax and energy prices
The optimal tax levels required for the restoration of the rst-best optimum and the stabilization of carbon atmospheric carbon are depicted in Figure 2 . The rst-best tax level starts from 49$/tC and follows a quite linear increase to reach 256$/tC by 2100. The stabilization to 550 and 450 requires much higher tax levels. Starting from respectively 73 and 172$/tC, they increase sharply, reach some high 550$/tC and 735$/tC in 2075 and 2055, before declining once the concentration ceiling has been reached. Naturally, the rate of increase of the carbon prices for the 450ppm target is more rapid than that of the 550ppm case. Those carbon prices prove slightly higher than Nordhaus (2008) estimates for similar climate strategies.
In any case, the tax pace evolves non-monotonically over time. This means that, from a particular future date, the last component in equation (47), that reects the harmed generation eect, overcomes the sum of the three rst ones. Moreover, in the case where a carbon target is introduced, this component is strengthened by the Lagrange multiplier ϕ G associated to the ceiling constraint. As long as the ceiling is not reached, this multiplier First, the fossil fuel market price increases only slowly due to the relative atness of our fossil fuel supply curve (see Figure 3-a) . The implementation of a carbon tax reduces the producer price which induces substantial rent transfers from extractive industries to governments. In 2105, the revenues losses for the fossil energy producer amount to 55% and 52% when carbon caps are set at 550 and 450ppm, respectively. The concerns of oil-rich countries towards stringent climate mitigation commitments has already been commented and assessed in the literature (see for example Bergstrom, 1982 , or Sinn, 2008 . Moreover, an increment in the R&D subsidy rates has no eect on the fossil fuel price, thus illustrating the absence of crossed eects in this case.
Simultaneously, introducing a carbon tax implies obviously a rise in the unit user cost of the fossil fuel (cf. c F,t as dened by (7) when backstop R&D is not granted at all whereas the lower ones imply some positive σ B .
Then, R&D subsidies mainly matter to explain a decrease in the backstop price whereas the level of tax has only a weak depressive eect. Again, there is no crossed eect.
R&D
The eects of directed technical change can be portrayed by examining the eective value of an innovation in both CCS and backstop R&D, V B and V S , as depicted in Figure 5 . The behavior of those innovation values provide insights on the allocation and the direction of R&D funding over time. First, the rising values demonstrate that the innovation activity grows strongly during the century, with the exception of the laisser-faire case which does not provide incentive for investing in CCS. Second, the increase in innovation values is strongly governed by the stringency of climate policy. Clearly, the introduction of a carbon ceiling induces the fastest increase in the eective value of innovations. Third, the role of each mitigation option can be inferred from the time-path of both CCS and backstop innovation values: CCS innovation value grows fast from the earliest periods, reaches a peak by around 2075 and starts declining thereafter. On the contrary, the backstop innovation value keeps on rising over time, though at a slow pace initially. A simple supply-demand argument is necessary to understand those behaviors. As the innovation activity is growing fast, due to the urgent need of developing carbon-free energy supply, and as the expected returns on CCS R&D are the highest initially because of relatively low 15 Results on energy R&D are less of interest and are not discussed here.
cost of technology improvement relative to the backstop, a "technology push" in favor of CCS cause its innovation value to rise fast. In the longer run, backstop energy oers larger deployment potential and thus takes over CCS investments. Its value then develops at a faster pace while the CCS innovation is becoming less valued as its development shrinks.
Those innovation values drive the R&D expenses owing to each research sector. Figure   6 depicts such R&D investments for our major cases. In the polar laisser-faire case, hardly any R&D budget is dedicated to research and CCS R&D is not nanced at all. A similar outcome occurs when an optimal tax is set while research subsidies are nil. When all research subsidies are optimally set without carbon tax, R&D allowances do not prot the CCS sector but mainly the backstop research sector that receives similar amounts to the rst-best optimal case. The rst-best optimum restoration calls for a continuous increase in R&D budgets that will mainly benet the development of the backstop technology. By the end of the century, overall R&D budgets will then have been multiplied by a factor of roughly 10, amounting to slightly less than 1 billion USD. The energy eciency sector and the CCS sector receive respectively 13 and 17% of total R&D budgets in 2100. Looking at the two stabilization cases, one notices drastic changes in R&D budgets allocation and volumes. By the end of century, the overall R&D budgets exceed the ones obtained when restoring the rst-best solution. The necessity of curbing quickly the net polluting emissions ow leads to substantial investments in CCS R&D that constitutes the cheapest mid-term mitigation option. The more stringent the carbon target, the higher is the share of CCS R&D spending.
Two conclusions can be drawn so far. The implementation a carbon tax alone hardly provides any incentive to proceed with R&D activities. In order to provide enough R&D incentives, one needs rst to correct for the externality by imposing a carbon tax and second by subsidizing the research sectors. Moreover, short term investment in carbon-free R&D, namely in CCS activities, can become relevant when imposing a stringent cap on carbon accumulation, or equivalently, an higher level of tax.
Additionally, results depicted in Figure 7 clearly demonstrate how important the subsidies become to both CCS and backstop research sectors when a cap on carbon accumulation is set. We have seen that subsidies ow massively to each sector by the middle of the century when the climate change adverse eects need to be urgently mitigated. However, the fossil fuel share, and then the total primary energy use, are strongly reduced.
Symmetrically, the implementation of research policies alone (i.e. moving from case A to case C) does not aect the fossil fuel use, but it slightly stimulates the backstop.
The simultaneous implementation of all optimal instruments (i.e. from case A to case D) reveals a complementarity eect between research grants and carbon taxation. Indeed, this scenario reinforces the eect of the tax on the fossil fuel use as observed in case B,
and it increases the fraction of carbon emissions that are eectively sequestered (up to 4%
of total carbon emissions in 2100). In addition, such a policy mix strengthens the role of backstop.
Finally, the two stabilization cases induce radical changes in world energy supply be- The larger the tax is, i.e. the lower the carbon ceiling is, the stronger the initial losses but also the higher the long run gains. we imposed a cap on the atmospheric carbon accumulation. Since the economy faces two types of market failures, global warming and R&D spillovers, the regulator uses two types of public tools to correct them, a carbon tax and a subsidy for each R&D sector. Obviously, a particular equilibrium is associated with each vector of instruments and there exists a unique vector that implements the rst-best optimum. We have analytically computed the optimal tax and subsidies and we have investigated their dynamic properties. In particular,
we have shown that the optimal time prole of the tax can be non-monotonic over time and we identied the four eects that drive this dynamics. In brief, three eects leads to a positive growth rate (the decay eect, the discount eect and the wealth eect), when the fourth one implies a negative growth rate (the harmed generation eect) so that the full eect is, a priori, undetermined.
In a second step, we have used a calibrated version of the theoretical model based on i) The optimal carbon tax is generally non-monotonous over time. In particular, under a carbon stabilization constraint, the harmed generation eect overrides the other ones and the tax declines when the ceiling is reached.
ii) Our results do not exhibit relevant crossed eects in the sense that the implementation of a carbon tax alone hardly provides any incentive to proceed with R&D activities and backstop production, when R&D policies used alone have only weak eects on the fossil fuel and CCS sectors.
iii) The implementation of the rst-best optimum reveals a complementarity eect between research grants and carbon taxation (the simultaneous use of the two types of tools reinforces the dissociated eects of each one used alone).
iv) The rst-best case (without ceiling) does not result in substantial carbon seques- Integrating (10) and using (9) and the transversality condition on Z t , we nd:
The rst characterizing condition (32) is obtained by replacing η into (9) by the expression above, and by noting that p F = Q E E F − (ξ − S F )/S I S from (3), (4) and (6), and that exp(− t 0 rds) = U (C) exp(−ρt)/U (C 0 ) from (24) . Combining (3), (5) and (13) leads to condition (33) . Condition (34) directly comes from (6) . Next, using (1) and (24), we directly get condition (35) . Finally, the dierentiation of (18) Substituting this expression into (16) and using (18) again, it comes:
We thus obtain the three last characterizing conditions (36), (37) and (38) 
The complementary slackness condition is: 
From (49), we nd that η = −µ G (ξ − S F ) − λ(Q E E F − 1/F I F ). Replacing this expression into (56) and using (48) leads to the following dierential equation:η = −(F Z /F I F )U (C) exp(−ρt). Integrating this expression and using the transversality condition (62), we obtain:
Replacing into (49) λ, µ G and η by their expressions coming from (48), (51) and (65), respectively, gives us the equation (39) 
Next, using the transversality condition (63), we determine the solution of the dierential equation (57) as:
where µ T is dened by (66) and ϕ G must be determined by looking at the behavior of the economy once the ceiling have been reached. Condition (41) is then obtained by replacing into (51) λ and µ G by their expressions coming from (48) and (67), respectively.
Log-dierentiating (48) with respect to time implies:
Condition (42) is a direct implication of equations (53) and (68). Finally, the log-dierentiation of (52) with respect to time yields:λ
Conditions (43) 
